bush-guest-iliescu-gates-nica-arto-maior-kovesi-nastase-ballmerBREAKING THE CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE

USA’s European ‘Partners in Crime’ must act after Senate Torture Report

Raportul Amnesty International – RUPIND CONSPIRATIA TACERII, cuprinde 33 de pagini, dintre care 5 pagini coperti, 4 pagini introducere si 9 pagini referintele, din cele 15 pagini ale raportului efectiv, 3 pagini sunt dedicate “DETENTION SITE BLACK” ROMANIA, respectiv 20% din intregul raport efectiv pe care le prezentam in original.

Raportul scoate in evidenta :

“ipocrizia” guvernelor europene din tari precum “Germany, Lithuania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia), Poland, Romania, and United Kingdom, fara de care intregul program de tortura “ineficienta” nu putea fi implementat,

“securitate nationala” si “secret de stat” motive dubioase si neprobate, invocate de diferite guverne care incearca sa se protejeze de raspundere sau pur si simplu “minciuni evidente” “various governments seeking to shield themselves from accountability based on unsubstantiated “national security” grounds, the dubious invocation of “state secrets,” or outright lies”

CIA a platit milioane de dolari unor persoane ce urmeaza a fi identificate, in toate tarile mentionate, in vederea constituirii si folosirii ilegale a unor centre de tortura si a unor servicii aferente, respectiv in perioada 2003 – 2006 in Romania.

Un fel de ecosistem in care CIA platea din fondurile proprii pentru obtinerea unor servicii, facilitati. si protectie. SUA urmeaza sa fie obligata sa plateasca prejudiciile astfel create de initiativele ilegale si tortionare ale CIA.

Conform raportului, Romania este reclamata la CEDO, urmind sa plateasca despagubiri celor prejudiciati, respectiv sume mult mai mari decit cele incasate de catre persoanele neidentificate inca, in vederea oferirii de locatii si servicii pentru torturarea bestiala si inutila a unor fiinte umane si pentru protejarea acestor ilegalitati. Afacerea se dovedeste paguboasa pentru CIA si statul Roman, si benefica pentru cei care au reusit sa profite.

Microsoft platise deja si continua sa plateasca, din bani “obtinuti” de la Guvernul Romaniei, in aceeasi perioada 2003-2006 zeci de milioane de euro unor inalti demnitari neidentificati inca, in vederea monopolizarii pietelor IT, in vederea eliminarii prin metode teroriste a oricarei competitii si pentru anihilarea oricarei critici sau opozitii.

Un fel de ecosistem in care Microsoft primeste bani de la statul Roman pentru a fura statul Roman in asociere cu entitati criminale si companii sub “acoperire”. Microsoft si asociatii acestora cistiga in timp ce singurii care pierd sunt statul Roman si toti cei care au refuzat sa participe la aceste jafuri si tilharii.

Doamna Kovesi aveti cumva vreo idee daca persoanele „neidentificate” inca in cele doua activitati ilegale sunt aceleasi ? Credeti ca este posibil ca Microsoft si CIA sa fi colaborat si in fapt banii platiti de CIA sa provina de la Microsoft care la rindul sau sa ii fi furat de la statul Roman, adica tot de la noi toti ?

Cum a platit CIA milioanele, a folosit numerar cum obisnuiesc sa faca de regula, sau au convenit un barter cu Microsoft, similar cu barterul acceptat de Microsoft in anul 2000, unde mita de un milion a fost ulterior transformata in licente la preturi si numar dublu pentru justificarea echilibrarii balantei de jaf si ticalosie ?

Intelegem justificarea CIA pentru a tortura teroristi si nu comentam asupra acesteia, dar nu intelegem determinarea Microsoft, SRI, MAI, DNA de a tortura romani care nu au facut decit sa creeze opere de valoare universala si sa respecte legea, ba chiar mai mult sa denunte acte deosebit de grave si periculoase care intr-adevar aduc prejudicii majore securitatii si intereselor nationale.

Vom reveni …


One of the most surprising reactions to the SSCI summary came from Ioan Talpes, the former head of the Romanian intelligence service (1992-1997) and national security adviser to then President Ion Ileiscu from 2000-2004. After years of official denials of any involvement in the CIA’s interrogation operations, Talpes told Der Spiegel on 13 December 2014 that the Romanian intelligence agency had in fact cooperated with the CIA and permitted it to operate “one or two” detention facilities in Romania where people “probably” were held between 2003 and 2006, and suffered inhumane treatment.37 Talpes said that he had informed then President Iliescu that the CIA was engaged in “certain activities” in Romania, but denied knowing at the time what was happening in the facilities. He claimed Romania had “explicitly taken no interest” in what the CIA was doing– and attributed the close cooperation with the CIA to Romania’s bid for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).38 Talpes’ admissions conform to information previously collected by a wide range of media, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that categorically concluded that Romania had hosted a secret CIA detention site where detainees were held and tortured and otherwise ill-treated.39

Shortly after Talpes’ statement, Prime Minister Victor Ponta claimed that he had no knowledge of CIA sites in Romania, but pointed to an on-going investigation by the Romanian Prosecutor General of allegations by Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri that he had been held in secret CIA detention in Romania (see below regarding al-Nashiri’s European Court of Human Rights case). Ponta has said that Romania will be “completely transparent” about any information it has regarding the facilities.40 It has been reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has launched its own inquiry and will request the full, unredacted version of the SSCI report from the US authorities.41

The admission by Ioan Talpes and the promise of transparency from Prime Minister Ponta signalled a sea change in terms of Romania’s approach to years of mounting evidence that it had in fact housed a secret CIA detention facility. Since it was first reported in the media in 2005 that Romania housed a secret site, the official response has been to categorically deny any involvement in the CIA operations and/or to maintain complete silence regarding any new allegations, including from credible sources at Council of Europe, EU, and UN levels.42 A Romanian Senate Committee of Inquiry conducted proceedings in secret and in 2007 concluded that Romania had no role in the CIA operations.43 Between 2008 and 2013 several media outlets claimed that their investigations revealed that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, among others, had been secretly held in Romania.44 Flight data collected by journalists and human rights organizations revealed several rendition flights into and out of Romania, and linked flights into and out of Poland with some arriving and departing Romania.45

In December 2011, an Associated Press and German TV report revealed that the CIA detention facility in Romania was called “Bright Light” and was located in a government building housing the National Registry Office for Classified Information (ORNISS) in

downtown Bucharest.46 In August 2012, the Open Society Justice Initiative lodged an application on Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri’s behalf against Romania at the European Court of Human Rights alleging that he had been held in secret CIA custody and tortured there.47 According to the Court’s “statement of facts,” after being held in CIA secret detention in Afghanistan (2002), Poland (2002-2003), Morocco (2003), Guantánamo Bay (2003-2004), and Morocco again (early 2004), al-Nashiri was moved to the CIA secret detention facility in Bucharest, Romania sometime in 2004.48 He was finally transferred back to Guantánamo Bay in September 2006.49

The SSCI summary refers to “DETENTION SITE BLACK,” (DSBK) the details of which closely correlate to public information and flight data regarding CIA rendition flights and the secret detention facility called “Bright Light” that operated in Bucharest from 2003-2005. Relevant information about DSBK in the SSCI report included:

  • Detainees were first transferred to DSBK in the fall of 2003; the CIA offered the authorities in that country millions of dollars to show appreciation for their support, including an additional unsolicited subsidy in the million/s of dollars (p. 97);
  • Although the US Ambassador at the time initially expressed concern about the legality of interrogations at the site and whether the US State Department was fully aware of the arrangement, he subsequently joined the CIA to encourage the authorities of the country to continue their support for the site, in part by “inaccurate representations” of the value of information gleaned through interrogations at DSBK (pp. 97-98);
  • n

  • The same chief expressed concern to CIA HQ regarding the detention of detainees who arguably were not involved in terrorism-related activity or were in no condition to undergo interrogation, including Janat Gul, transferred to DSBK in January 2004 (p. 396) and who suffered „frightful” hallucinations following sleep deprivation and about whom the chief of the detention facility wrote, „[t]here simply is no ‘smoking gun’ that we can refer to that would justify our continued holding of [Janat Gul] at a site such as [DSBK] (pp. 16, fn 33; p. 349);
  • Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was transferred to DSBK in the fall of 2003 (p. 95);
  • Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was held in DSBK in 2004-2005 (p. 73, fn 372); his extreme psychological problems were a key consideration in the CIA’s move toward an “end game” regarding detention operations (p. 114, fn 674);
  • Hassan Ghul was transferred to DSBK in January 2004 and was immediately subjected to EITs (p. 375);
  • Abu Faraj al-Libi was transferred to DSBK in May 2005; EITs were used on him there two days before the Office of Legal Counsel memos concluded that EITs did not violate the US’s international legal obligations, namely Article 16 of the UN Convention Against Torture (pp. 147-148);
  • After the publication of Dana Priest’s article on 2 November 2005 revealing the presence in central and eastern Europe of secret CIA detention sites the authorities in the country where DSBK was located demanded the closure of DSBK and all detainees were transferred out of DSBK “shortly thereafter” (p. 153).50

In light of the SSCI study summary, Amnesty International reiterates it call on the Romanian government to promptly initiate an effective investigation, ensure that those state actors responsible for crimes under international law such as torture and enforced disappearance are brought to justice, and afford victims an effective remedy.51 In light of recent public admissions and statements of current and former Romanian officials, we urge the Romanian authorities to vigorously pursue all lines of inquiry in the case – including what laws may have been violated by the alleged transfer of any monies from the US to Romanian authorities for the purpose of hosting a secret detention site — and to conclude the investigation as a matter of urgency.